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Abstract
An approach for designing countermeasures to cure
conflict in aircraft pilots’ activities is presented,
both based on Artificial Intelligence and Human
Factors concepts.
The first step is to track the pilot’s activity, i.e. to
reconstruct what he has actually done thanks to the
flight parameters and reference models describing
the mission and procedures. The second step is
to detect conflict in the pilot’s activity, and this is
linked to what really matters to the achievement
of the mission. The third step is to design accu-
rate countermeasures which are likely to do bet-
ter than the existing onboard devices. The three
steps are presented and supported by experimental
results obtained from private and professional pi-
lots.
1 Introduction
The review of civilian and military reports reveals that a con-
flictual situation is a precursor to the loss of aircrews’ situa-
tion awareness and is a major cause of air accidents. Conflict
may occur through different forms: open conflict between the
different operators (Air Philippines crash, April 1999), repre-
sentation conflict about the aircraft position (Korean air, Au-
gust 1997), resource conflict (Streamline, May 2000), knowl-
edge conflict (Crossair, January 2000), or more recently, a
conflict between automated systems (TCAS) and human op-
erators (air collision between a Tupolev 154 and a Boeing 757
over Switzerland, July 2002). Therefore, the idea is to detect
conflict so as to propose accurate on-line countermeasures to
pilots.
The first step is to track the pilot’s activity, i.e. to reconstruct
what he has actually done thanks to the flight parameters and
reference models describing the mission and procedures. The
second step is to detect conflict in the pilot’s activity, and this
is linked to what really matters to the achievement of the mis-
sion. The third step is to design accurate countermeasures
which are likely to do better than the existing onboard de-
vices. The three steps are presented and supported by experi-
mental results obtained both from private and military pilots.
2 Track the pilot’s activity
2.1 Reference model
The approach to capture the pilot’s activity is based on situa-
tion tracking classically used for system diagnosis, monitor-
ing and intelligence [Ghallab, 1996; Chaudron et al., 1997;
Rota and Thonnat, 2000]. Whatever the formalism used to
represent knowledge, situation tracking rests on a matching
between observed facts and known situations (reference mod-
els), and its object is to carry out postdictions, predictions or
to diagnose the current state of the system.
To represent knowledge, we use the concept of propositional
attitude, “which covers the notions of belief, desire, inten-
tion, [...] which have in common the fact of being identified
by their propositional contents” [Tessier et al., 2000].
Definition: a propositional attitude (PA) is a pair (K, T )
where K is a logical cube, i.e. a conjunction of first order
literals [Chaudron et al., 2003], and T is the time interval
within which the properties captured by K are true.
The pilot’s knowledge is divided into three categories of PAs,
which constitute the reference model:
• Propositional attitude goal describes a goal of the mission.
Ex: pa goal(goal(5),<Landing(francazal)>,T)
means that the fifth goal of the mission is to land at Francazal
during time interval T.
• Propositional attitude plan describes the properties the pilot
is committed to satisfy to reach a PA-goal as long as he car-
ries out this goal.
Ex: pa plan(goal(5),<VOR frequency(116),
VOR heading deflection(true),gear down(true),
flaps down(2),visibility(true)>,T)
means that to satisfy goal 5, the pilot has to select the accu-
rate radio frequency, fly a correct route, lower gears and flap
deflection 2 and have a good visibility during time interval T.
• A crucial propositional attitude describes the hard con-
straints associated to one or several goals.
Ex: pa crucial(goal(5),<visibility(true)>,T)
means that to succeed in landing at Francazal, the pilot must
have a correct visibility during T.
Remark: the model does not implement deontic logic [Traum
and Allen, 1994] to capture the pilot’s obligations; at each
time step, the system will check whether the pilot meets the
different constraints on the PA-goals.
2.2 Observed activity
The pilot’s activity is observed and analyzed through his ac-
tions on the airplane interface: during the experiments, the
flight parameters are recorded every second. The parameters
are then translated into symbolic knowledge and aggregated
to build observation propositional attitudes.
The numerical thresholds that are used for numerical to sym-
bolic translation are adjusted during interviews with the pilots
to built an accurate model for each pilot. For example, if the
pilot has to fly 2500 ft, he defines his own flight envelope
where he feels secure [Amalberti and Wioland, 1997]. After
numerical to symbolic translation, parameter altitude is char-
acterized as altitude(false) (i.e. out of flight envelope)
or altitude(true) (i.e. within flight envelope).
The same kind of analysis is performed with parameters such
as the route, the fuel level, etc.
Therefore, propositional attitude observation describes per-
ceived and deduced facts from the pilot’s activity:
Ex: pa obs(<VOR frequency(116),
VOR heading deflection(true),gear down(true),
flaps down(3),visibility(false)>,<1500,1500>)
means that at time 1500, the pilot has selected the accurate
radio frequency, is flying a correct route, has lowered gears
and flap deflection 3 and has a bad visibility.
3 Detect conflict
3.1 Conflict
Considering research in the field of A.I. and partic-
ularly on multi-agent systems, the focus has been
brought much on how to avoid, solve or get rid of
conflicts, especially via negotiation [Sycara, 1989;
Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994], argumentation [Jung and
Tambe, 2000] or constraint satisfaction [Conry et al., 1991;
Khedro and Genesereth, 1994; Hannebauer, 2000]. Such
approaches, where (i) conflict is likened to formal inconsis-
tency and (ii) the internal knowledge of the agents is clearly
identified, are not suited to our purpose. Indeed in aeronau-
tics, uncertainty on data is high and the human behavior is
extremely variable and unpredictable. Moreover, while in
air, aircrews frequently face incoherent situations due to the
uncertain environment (e.g. weather, failures) or because
of their own errors. Nevertheless, these situations are not
necessarily conflictual, and pilots are used to going on with
their missions with such inconsistencies. An inconsistency
becomes conflictual only if it leads to a critical flight phase
and matters to the mission or to the aircrew’s safety.
Therefore we are very close to Easterbrook’s definition of
conflict [Easterbrook, 1991]: “[...] viewpoints are free to
differ, and only conflict when that difference matters for
some reason, leading to interference. [...] A conflict, then,
is simply a difference that matters.” This point of view
has been emphasized in social sciences [Festinger, 1957;
Lewin et al., 1939] and in A.I. applied to social modeling
[Castelfranchi, 2000], where human conflict is seen as the
result of an impossibility to succeed in a goal that matters.
Definition: a conflict is a set of propositional attitudes that is
not coherent1 and the fact that it is not coherent matters.
The inconsistency of a set of PAs matters either because
there is a need:
• to satisfy the rationality2 of the agent(s) involved (pilot,
copilot ...);
• or to build a coherent set of knowledge;
• or to decide on further goals.
All these different reasons are implemented in the reference
model as crucial propositional attitudes (see section 2.1).
Therefore a conflict is an incoherent set of knowledge that
matters through one or several crucial propositional attitudes.
3.2 Conflict detection
Conflict detection is a tracking process that monitors the
pilot’s PAs at each time step t. It is a two-step process: (1)
detect the sets of PAs that are not coherent at time t and (2)
detect the conflicts given the crucial PAs that concern time
t. One could have designed a single-step process, however
it is of great interest to track PAs that are not coherent and
do not conflict: indeed, contrary to the minimal inconsistent
sets approach [De Kleer, 1986], we aim at capturing all
the inconsistencies and analyzing how they are managed
by the pilots for “lessons learned” and further man-artefact
interaction model tuning.
(1) Detect the sets of PAs that are not coherent
Predicate not hold together detects incoherent sets of
PAs Inct at time t.
Ex: given the set of PAs
• pa goal(goal(5),<Landing(francazal)>,<1000,t1>)
• pa plan(goal(5),<VOR frequency(116),
VOR heading deflection(true),gear down(true),
flaps down(2),visibility(true)>,<1000,t1>)
• pa obs(<VOR frequency(116),
VOR heading deflection(true),gear down(true),
flaps down(3),visibility(false)>,<1500,1500>),
two incoherent sets of PAs are detected:
→ not hold together(pa plan(5,flaps down(2)),
pa obs(flaps down(3),<1500,1500>);
→ not hold together(pa plan(5,visibility(true),
pa obs(visibility(false)),<1500,1500>).
(2) Detect the conflicts
The crucial PAs that concern time t are then considered.
Definition: let Inct an incoherent set of PAs at time t. If
Inct includes PAs or properties that matter through one or
several crucial PAs, then Inct is a conflict.
Predicate matters screens sets Inct thanks to the crucial
PAs, so as to determine whether they are conflicts or not.
Ex: for the previous example, the crucial PA that holds at
time 1500 is:
• pa crucial(goal(5),<visibility(true)>,
<1000,t1>)
Predicate matters detects that one of the two incoherent
1in relation to the formalism used to represent the properties in
the PAs.
2According to Festinger [Festinger, 1957] who postulates that an
individual always aims at being coherent when interacting with his
environment.
sets of PAs is conflictual:
matters(pa plan(goal(5),visibility(true)),
pa obs(visibility(false),<1500,1500>)
The other set of PAs relative to flaps deflection is not a
conflict because a landing with flap deflection 3 is possible
even though less recommended.
3.3 Preliminary experiment and results
A preliminary experiment designed to test conflict tracking
[Dehais, 2002] was conducted with ten pilots on a research
flight simulator. The pilots were proposed a flight scenario
whose aim was to follow a flight plan at a constant altitude
and then land with instruments. The difficult point in this
scenario was to manage the fuel consumption correctly con-
sidering refuelling areas.
This experiment has validated conflict detection and interest-
ingly enough has shown that a psychological perseveration
phenomenon appeared with conflict : the pilots who faced
conflictual situations did not come to the right decision to
solve their conflict, on the contrary they got themselves tan-
gled up in it, and all the more so since the temporal pressure
was increasing. The most surprising thing was that all the
necessary data to come to the accurate decision were avail-
able and displayed on the onboard equipments.
Ex: one of the pilots flew toward waypoint 5 instead of fly-
ing first over waypoint 6 for refuelling, and started circling
around, until he ran out of fuel (see figure 1).
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Figure 1: Conflict and perseveration
During the debriefing, the pilot explained that he was con-
vinced that waypoint 5 was the refuelling area (in spite of
the map displayed in the cockpit); he reached it and noticed
that the fuel level did not increase. Thinking he had missed
waypoint 5, he decided to fly back to waypoint 5. He did
this manoeuvre again and again till he ran out of fuel, getting
more and more stressed.
4 Send accurate countermeasures
4.1 Guidelines
The findings of the preliminary experiments are akin
to a recently published report of the BEA3 (the French
national institute for air accident analysis) that re-
veals that pilots’ erroneous attitudes of persevera-
tion have been responsible for more than 40 percent
of casualties in air crash (in civilian aeronautics).
This behavior, called the “perseveration syndrome”,
is studied in neuropsychology [Vand Der Kolk, 1994;
Pastor, 2000] and psychology [Beauvois and Joule, 1999]:
it is known to summon up all the pilot’s mental efforts
toward a unique objective (excessive focus on a single
display or focus of the pilot’s reasoning on a single task).
Once entangled in perseveration, the pilot does anything to
succeed in his objective even if it is dangerous in terms of
security, and worse, he neglects any kind of information that
could question his reasoning (like alarms or data on displays).
Therefore the idea is to design countermeasures in order to
break this mechanism and get the pilot out of the conflict. The
design of the countermeasures is grounded on the following
theoretical and empirical results:
• conflictual situations lead pilots to persevere;
• additional information (alarms, data on displays) designed
to warn pilots are often unnoticed when pilots persevere.
Our conjectures are then:
→ with an accurate on-line conflict detection, it is possible to
analyze and predict the subject of the pilot’s perseveration;
→ instead of adding information (classical alarms), it is more
efficient to remove the information on which the pilot is fo-
cused and which makes him persevere, and to display a mes-
sage to explain his error instead.
Ex: in the experiment described afterwards, pilots persevere
in trying a dangerous landing at Francazal despite the bad
visibility, with a particular focus on an instrument called the
H.S.I.4 to locate Francazal airport. The countermeasures will
consist in removing the H.S.I. during a few seconds, to dis-
play two short messages instead, one after the other (“Land-
ing is dangerous”... ”look at central display”) and next to
send an explanation of the conflict on the central display
(“Low visibility on Francazal, fly back to Blagnac”).
The idea here is to shock the pilot’s attentional mechanisms
with the short disappearance of the H.S.I., to introduce a cog-
nitive conflict (“if I land, I crash”) to affect the pilot’s reason-
ing, and to propose a solution on the central display.
3http://www.bea-fr.org
4The H.S.I is a display that gives the route to follow and indicates
any discrepancy from the selected route.
4.2 GHOST
Ghost is an experimental environment designed to test coun-
termeasures to cure the pilot’s perseveration. It is composed
of:
• Flightgear5, an open source flight simulator, which means
that many modifications can be made, e.g. implementing new
displays. To fly the airplane, pilots have a stick, rudder and
a keyboard. Almost all the airports and beacons (NDB and
VOR6) of the world are modeled, and the air traffic control is
simulated. During the experiment, the flight simulator inter-
face is displayed on a giant screen;
• Atlas7, a freeware designed to follow the pilot’s route. The
airplane trajectory, cities, airports and beacons are displayed
with an adjustable focus;
• a wizard of Oz interface (see figure2) we have designed
and implemented, which allows a human operator to trigger
events (failures, weather alteration and the countermeasures)
from an external computer via a local connection (TCP/IP
protocol, sockets communication).
As far as the countermeasures are concerned, several actions
are available to the wizard of Oz:
• replace a display on which the pilot is focused by a black
one (time of reappearance is adjustable);
• blink a display (frequency and time of blinking is ad-
justable);
• fade a display and brighten it again;
• send a message to a blinked, removed or faded display;
• send a message to the central display for explicit conflict
solving.
Figure 2: The wizard of Oz interface - countermeasures
4.3 Experimental scenarios
As conflict appears when a desired goal cannot be reached,
we have designed three experimental scenarios where a cru-
5http://www.flightgear.org/
6NDB and VOR are two kind of radionavigation beacons used to
guide pilots.
7http://atlas.sf.net
cial goal of the mission cannot be achieved:
• scenario 1 is a navigation task from Toulouse-Blagnac air-
port to Francazal airport including three waypoints (VOR
117.70, NDB 331 and NDB 423). An atmospheric depres-
sion is positioned in such a way that the pilot cannot see the
landing ground but at the last moment when it is too late to
land on it.
• scenario 2 is a navigation task from Toulouse-Blagnac air-
port to Francazal airport including three waypoints (VOR
117.70, NDB 415 and NDB 423). The visibility is decreased
from the runway threshold: from far away, the landing ground
is visible but as the pilot gets closer to it, it disappears totally
in a thick fog.
• scenario 3 is a navigation from Toulouse-Blagnac back to
Toulouse-Blagnac including three waypoints (VOR 117.70,
NDB 331 and NDB 423). An atmospheric depression is posi-
tioned over waypoint 2 (NDB 331), and as the pilot flies over
this waypoint, the left engine fails.
In scenarios 1 and 2 the pilot’s conflict can be summarized as
“should I try a dangerous landing at Francazal or should I
fly back to Blagnac for a safer landing?”. If our conjectures
hold, pilots will persevere and try to land at Francazal.
In scenario 3, the pilot’s conflict can be summarized as
“should I go on with the mission despite the failure or should
I land at Francazal and therefore abort the mission?”
4.4 Experimental Results
21 experiments were conducted with Ghost in December
2002 (see figure 3). The pilots’ experiences ranged from
novice (5 hours, small aircraft) to very experienced (3500
hours, military aircraft). Conflicts where detected with the
conflict tracker (described above) and were inputs for the wiz-
ard of Oz to elaborate the countermeasures.
Results for scenarios 1 and 2: “impossible landing”
In these scenarios, the pilots faced the decision of mission
abortion, i.e. not to land at Francazal and fly back to Blagnac.
Both scenarios were tested within two different contexts:
without countermeasures and with countermeasures.
• Context 1: no countermeasures
7 pilots tested scenario 1 or 2 without any countermeasures
(see next table). “Circuits” corresponds to the number of cir-
cuits performed by the pilot round Francazal before crashing
or landing.
Pilot Scenario Circuits Results
Pilot1 1 3 crash
Pilot2 1 3 crash
Pilot3 1 1 chance landing
Pilot4 1 1 chance landing
Pilot5 2 1 crash
Pilot6 2 1 chance landing
Pilot7 2 1 crash
The results suggest that without any countermeasures,
none of the pilots came to the right decision (fly back to
Blagnac): they all persevered at trying to land at Francazal.
Four of them hit the ground, and the other three had a “chance
landing”, which means that while they were flying round
Francazal, the runway appeared between two fog banks and
they succeeded in achieving a quick landing. During the de-
briefing, all of them admitted they had come to an erroneous
and dangerous decision.
• Context 2: with countermeasures
12 pilots tested scenario 1 or 2 with countermeasures (see
next table). “Circuits” corresponds to the number of circuits
performed by the pilot round Francazal before a countermea-
sures is triggered by the wizard of Oz.
Pilot Scenario Circuits Results
Pilot8 1 3 crash on Francazal
Pilot9 1 2 back to Blagnac
Pilot10 1 2 back to Blagnac
Pilot11 1 2 back to Blagnac
Pilot12 2 3 back to Blagnac
Pilot13 2 2 back to Blagnac
Pilot14 2 2 back to Blagnac
Pilot15 2 2 back to Blagnac
Pilot16 1 2 chance landing Francazal
Pilot17 1 2 back to Blagnac
Pilot18 1 2 back to Blagnac
Pilot19 1 5 crash on Francazal
The results show the efficiency of the countermeasures
to cure perseveration: 9 pilots out of 12 changed their
minds thanks to the countermeasures, and flew back safely
to Blagnac. During the debriefing, all the pilots confirmed
that the countermeasures were immediately responsible for
their change of mind. Moreover, the short disappearance of
the data due to the countermeasures did not cause any stress
to them. 4 military pilots found that the solutions proposed
by the countermeasures were close to what a human co-pilot
would have proposed.
The results with Pilot19 suggest that the more a pilot perse-
veres, the more difficult it is to get him out of perseveration.
During the debriefing, Pilot19 told us that he was obsessed
by the idea of landing, and that he became more and more
stressed as long as he was flying round Francazal. He then
declared that he did not notice any countermeasures. Pilot16
and Pilot8 also persevered despite the countermeasures: they
declared they knew they were not flying properly and that
they had done that on purpose because they wanted to test the
flight simulator.
Results for scenario 3: “failure”
Only 2 pilots tested scenario 3. One pilot experimented this
scenario without any countermeasures: he did not notice the
failure and hit the ground. The second pilot was warned
through the countermeasures that he had a failure and that
there was a landing ground at vector 80: the pilot immediately
performed an emergency landing on this landing ground.
Other experiments are currently being conducted with this
scenario.
Other results
During the experiments, 9 pilots made errors, e.g. selection
of a wrong radio frequency, erroneous altitude, omission to
retract flaps and landing gear. To warn them, the wizard of
Oz blinked the display on which they were focusing and
displayed the error (e.g.: “gear still down”). In each case,
the countermeasure was successful: the pilots performed
the correct action at once. During the debriefing, the pilots
declared that this kind of alarm was very interesting, and
much more efficient and stressless than a classical audio or
visual alarm because they could identify at once what the
problem was.
These experiments have shown also the significance of the
message contents on the blinked display. For example, as far
as the erroneous landing at Francazal is concerned, the ini-
tial message was “Don’t land”, but the pilots did not take it
into account, thinking it was a bug of the simulator. When
the message was changed to “Fly back to Blagnac” or “Im-
mediate overshoot” it was understood and taken into account
at once.
Figure 3: GHOST
5 Conclusion and perspectives
We have presented an approach to detect and cure conflicts in
aircraft pilots’ activities. A first experiment has validated the
conflict detection tool and has shown that pilots facing con-
flicts have a trend to persevere in erroneous behaviors. This
agrees with the observations made by experts of the pilots’
behaviors in real air accidents. These first results have led us
to design GHOST, an experimental environment dedicated to
test countermeasures designed to get pilots out of persever-
ation. A second experiment was conducted with twenty-one
pilots in this new experimental environment: it has proved
the efficiency of the countermeasures to cure perseveration
and has also confirmed the relevance of conflict detection.
Further experiments are to be conducted to go on tuning the
countermeasures according to the pilots’ feedback.
The next step is to design and implement the whole coun-
termeasures closed-loop, i.e to remove the wizard of Oz and
perform an automated conflict and perseveration manage-
ment. This is currently done thanks to (see figure 4):
• the conflict detection tool (see section 3).
• Kalmansymbo(ae´ro), a situation tracker and predictor
[Tessier, 2003] which is based on predicate/transition timed
Petri nets for procedure and pilot’s activity modeling.
Kalmansymbo assesses the current situation thanks to the pa-
rameters received in real-time from Flightgear and predicts
what is likely to happen. Both the current situation and the
predictions are inputs for the conflict detection tool, which
allows possible conflicts to be better anticipated.
• a tool for building and sending accurate countermeasures
back to the pilot via the Flightgear cockpit.
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Figure 4: The countermeasures closed-loop
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